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The constitutional question is an open one so far as the Supreme Court
of Wyoming is concerned. As just demonstrated, there is ample authority
that the statutes are valid, but there is also logical enlightened authority
that the statutes are unconstitutional and hence void.
From he standpoint of physical anthropolgy there is also another
criticism of the statutes in that the classifications are often on a cultural
or geographical basis rather than on the racial basis upon which they
purport to be founded.
In terms of legislative trends the existence of the statutes is inconsistent
with the policy of the Wyoming Legislature evidenced in recent years.
Th 1955 Wyoming Legislature repealed a statute which had provided for
optional segregation in Wyoming schools.5 4 The same legislature adopted
"Equal Rights" as the state motto.55 When a Civil Rights Bill was introduced 6 it was defeated on the grounds that tolerance is desirable but it
cannot be forced by legislation.
The Wyoming statutes probably serve little purpose other than as a
source of harassment and uncertainty to those who have violated the provisions. The writer has not been advised of any prosecutions which have
been instituted thereunder in Wyoming, and in the absence of additional
circumstances it is believed that few county attorneys would be disposed
to prosecute. As pointed out, the statutes can probably be avoided if the
couple marries in a state which has neither a miscegenation statute nor tht
Uniform Marriage Evasion Act. This leaves the prohibition of the statut
as a burden only upon those who lack the money to go out of the state to
be married, those who do not know of the existence of the statute or how
to avoid its provisions, and those who are not concerned with the inheritance of property. As a deterrent to interracial marriages, the statutes are
probable failures. As Edward Byron Reuter has observed in his book,
Race Mixture, "the legislation itself probably has no effect whatever upon
the rate of racial intermixture."' 7
\\ILLIA-M E. FOSTER

NET WORTH METHOD OF PROSECUTION FOR TAX EVASION
Determination of a taxpayer's income by indirect means in a tax
evasion prosecution has increased considerably in the past few years. In
very few recent cases has unreported income been shown by specific or
direct proof of unrecoided transactions. The so-called "net worth"
method of proof seems to be the indirect means most frequently used by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is apparent that they apply it now in
54.
55.
56.
57.

Sess. Laws 1955 c. 36.
Sess. Laws 1955 c. 102.
H. B. 86 Introduced Wyoming State Legislature, January 20, 1955.
Reuter, Race Mixture, 103.
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almost all criminal cases and in a high percentage of civil cases as well.
This method of determining the liability of a taxpayer is an established
practice of the government and has received the sanction of courts in many
cases. Therefore, it has become increasingly important for lawyers to
understand the legal and accounting principles upon which this method
rests.
This note will be confined to a discussion of the net worth method as
used in fraud or criminal cases.
In applying the method the Government reconstructs the net worth
of the taxpayer at the beginning and at the end of the year in question,
treating the increase in net worth, plus non-deductible disbursements,
minus non-taxable receipts, as income. If the resulting figure for any year
is substantially greater than the taxable income reported by the taxpayer
for that year, the Government contends that the excess represents unreported taxable income.
The leading case law in this topic is Holland v. United States,' handed
2
down recently by the Supreme Court, along with three companion cases,
wherein it outlined the broad principles governing the trial and review of
cases based upon this theory.
The Government's right to employ the net worth method is not based
on any specific statutory authorization; however, its use is derived from

Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code.3 This subdivision provides that
the tax agents, in computing net income, are required to use the method
of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer.
If no such method of accounting has been employed, or if the method does
not clearly reflect the income, the computation may be made by such
method, as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the
income. When using the net worth method the Government must show
the inadequacy of the taxpayer's books and records.4 Some courts have
held that the net worth method of computing income may be used only
where the taxpayer does not keep books, or where his books are inadequate
in that they do not clearly reflect his income.: A California court refused
to use the net worth method in prosecuting a lawful Nevada gambler whose
6
bookkeeping methods were of common use in the profession in that state.
Furthermore it pointed out that the use of this method is limited to cases
where there were no books of account kept in the ordinary course of
business or where books were not kept in the manner in which a person
engaged in legitimate enterprise would keep them. But the Holland case
1.

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed 127 (1954).

2.

Friedburg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142, 75 S.Ct. 138, 99 L.Ed 140 (1954); United
States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 75 S.Ct. 186, 99 L.Ed. 152 (195.) ; Smith v. United
States, 348 U.S. 147, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 143 (1954).

3.

26 U.S.C.A. § 41.

4.

5.

E.g., United States v. Riganto, 121 F.Supp. 158, 151 (E.D.Va. 1954):
Rernmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 286 (9th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Wil-

6.

liams, 208 F.2d 437, 438 (3rd Cir. 1953).
United States v. Clark, 123 F.Supp. 608 (S.D.Cal. 1954).
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refutes these contended limitations. The court ruled that the provision,
"net income shall be computed . . . in accordance with the method of
accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer
*

. .",

relates only to the method of accounting used by the taxpayer in his

records and is not to be construed to require proof by the government of
false or inadequate bookkeeping as a foundation for the use of the net worth
theory. The court added that the net worth technique is not a method
of accounting at all, except in so far as it calls upon taxpayers to account
for their unexplained income.
When the Government relies upon circumstances of increased net
worth in excess of reported income to establish income tax evasion, the
basic net worth at the beginning of the tax year must be clearly and
accurately established by competent evidence. 7 A starting point from
which to calculate future increases in the taxpayer's assets is of course
very essential because the correctness of the result rests entirely upon the
inclusion in this figure of all assets on hand at the outset.
The taxpayer usually contends that the net worth increase shown by
the Government's statement is in reality not an increase at all because of
the existence of substantial cash on hand which was not included.8 This
defense asserts that the alleged cash was not expended for various reasonsuntil the prosecution period. But the Government corroborates the
certainty of its net worth computation by submitting evidence of the taxpayer's financial history prior to the years or years in question.9 From this
evidence the jury may infer that a person who had substantial cash would
not undergo hardship and privation. The possiability of accumulating
cash can also be negated by going into the accused's income tax history.' 0
Income declared in previous years could be insufficient to enable a person
to save any appreciable amount of money. Evidence of unexplained funds
or assets in the hands of a taxpayer establishes a prima facie case of the
understatement of income and it is then incumbent on the defendant to
overcome the logical inferences to be drawn from the facts proved."
In the case of Remmer v. United States,2 reference was made during
the trial to a certain safe deposit box in which the defendant purported to
keep money. The taxpayer contended that the possibility that substantial
funds were kept in the box destroyed the validity of the Government's net
worth computations, yet he did not in any way at the trial prove that
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

E.g., United States v. Skidmore, 123 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1941): Bryan v. United
States. 175 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949): Brodella v. United States, 184 F.2d 823 (6th
Cir. 1950).
E.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 132, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 LEd. 127 (1954)
Friedburg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142, 75 S.Ct. 138, 99 L.Ed 140 (1954) ; United
States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 75 S.Ct. 186. 99 L.Ed. 152 (1954) : Smith v. United
States, 348 U.S. 147, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 143 (1954); Jelaza v. United States, 179
F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1950); Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950).
E.g., Friedburg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142, 75 S.Ct. 138, 99 L.Ed. 140 (1954).
E.g., Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 LEd. 143 (1954).
E.g., United States v. Hornstein, 176 F2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1949).
Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 287 (9th Cir. 1953).

NOrES
said funds were in fact kept in the box. Other evidence introduced at
the trial tended to show that defendant did not have substantial cash at
the beginning of the prosecution period. Requests by the Government to
examine the contents of the safe deposit box were refused. The court said
that if a defendant could prevent a case of this type from being submitted
to the jury merely by stating he had further assets not taken into consideration by the Government, yet refusing to disclose them, enforcement of the
tax evasion provisions of the Internal Revenue Code would be completely
frustrated. But when the Government rests its case solely on the approximations and circumstantial inferences of a net worth computation, the
cogency of its proof depends upon its effective negation of reasonable
explanations by the taxpayer inconsistent with guilt. Such refutation might
fail when the Government does not probe relevant leads furnished by the
taxpayer-leads reasonably susceptible of being checked, which, if true,
would establish the taxpayer's innocence.13 This does not mean that the
Government must completely answer irrational explanations. In Hooper
v. United States,14 the accused was being prosecuted for the years 1946
through 1951 inclusive. The defendant claimed that he had made substantial loans prior to 1927 that were repaid in 1945, 1946, and 1947 and
that all such debtors had died since making such payments. The court
ruled that this was not a reasonable explanation of his net worth increase.
It felt that since there were no records of the alleged loans or support by
any other corroborating evidence and especially in view of the long period
which had elapsed between the time allegedly made and repaid, the
Government was justified in omitting such items from their net worth
computations. If the Government fails to show an investigation into the
validity of reasonable leads, the trial judge may consider them as true and
the Government's case insufficient to go to the jury.' 5 This should aid
in preventing unjust prosecutions. But the Government is not required
to prove a negative or refute all possible speculation as to the source of
the taxpayer's asserted funds.'
Another requirement in the use of this method is that there be evidence
to support the inference that net worth increases are attributable to currently taxable income. 17 Since the increases will include any sums received by the taxpayer as gifts, loans, inheritances and other non-taxable
sources, proper allowance must be made for them. The taxpayer usually
admits to the investigating agents that none were received.18 Also, the
Revenue agents usually obtain the taxpayer's own estimate of his living
expenses, which sum they include in making their computations of income.
Increases in net worth, standing alone, can not be assumed to be attributable
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

E.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 132, 75 S.Ct. 127, 135, 99 L.Ed. 127
Hooper v. United States, 216 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir. 1954).
E.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 132, 75 S.Ct. 127, 135, 99 L.Ed. 127
Bradford v. United States, 130 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1942); Jelaza v. United
179 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1949).
E.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 132, 75 S.Ct. 127, 135, 99 L.Ed. 127
Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1950).

(1954).
(1954).
States,
(1954).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

to currently taxable income. But proof of a likely source, from which the
jury could reasonably find that the net worth increases sprung, is sufficient
according to United States v. Johnson.19 This case held that proof of
expenditures exceed ing declared available resources was sufficient' to
support the finding that some unreported income was properly attributable
to current earnings. The Government can not disregard explanations of
the taxpayer which can reasonably be checked. Where no leads are offered,
the Government is not required to negate every possible source of non20
taxable income, a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused.
In proving an attempt to evade income tax, it is not necessary that the
Government introduce evidenceas to the exact amount of the additional
tax. 2'1 To make a case for the jury, it is sufficient that the Government
present substantial evidence from which the jury can find that beyond 22a
reasonable doubt a substantial amount of net income was not reported.
How much evidence must be offered by the prosecution depends on the facts
23
of the particular case.
Although the Government has established an increase by the figures
in its net worth computations, the crime of tax evasion does not automatically follow. The attempt must be willful, that is, done with the
intent that the Government should be defrauded of the income tax due.
Mere failure to make a complete and accurate report of income for taxation is not enough to support a verdict of conviction. A state of mind
is, of course, very difficult to prove. But direct proof thereof is not essential.
A willful attempt to ei'ade income taxes may be inferred from the taxpayer's concealment of assets or covering sources of income, handling of
the kind,
one's affairs to avoid making records usual in transactions of
24
and any other conduct, the likely effect of which is to conceal.
The charge to the jury should include a comprehensive and unified
summary of the nature of the net worth method, the assumptions upon
which it rests, and the inferences available both for and against the
25
accused.
A net worth case is based on inferences drawn from circumstances.
The jury is asked by the Government to infer that all of the taxpayer's
assets were included in the Government's proof and that the increase in
net worth represents taxable receipts which were willfully not reported.
This has led many courts to be disturbed by the use of the method. But
if, as pointed out in the Retnmer case, a defendant could prevent a case
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517, 63 S.Ct. 1233, 1240, L.Ed. 1546 (1943).
Cf. Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89, 91-92, 53 S.Ct. 522, 77 L.Ed. i051 (1933).
United States v. Eshenck, 126 F.2d 702, 704 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1949); Gendelnan v. United States, 191 F.2d 993, 996
(9th Cir. 1951).
Watts v. United States, 212 F.2d 275, 277 (10th Cir. 1954).
Returner v. United States, 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953).
Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666, 672 (8th Cir. 1953); Graves v. United States,
191 F.2d 579, 583 (10th Cir. 1951).
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 127 (1954).
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this type from being submitted to the jury merely by stating that he had
further assets not taken into consideration by the Government, yet refusing
to disclose them, enforcement of the tax evasion provision of the Internal
Revenue Code would be completely frustrated. Congress has relied for
the collection of income tax largely upon the taxpayers own disclosures.
The Government should be allowed to use all legal evidence available to
it in determining if the taxpayer's representations accurately reflect his
financial history. In view of its widespread use, the Government deems
the net worth method useful in enforcement of its income tax laws. Nevertheless, the courts should carefully scrutinize all aspects of a case in which
circumstantial evidence as to guilt is the chief weapon of a method that is
itself only an approximation.
DEAN

BORTHWICK

DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
APPLIED TO INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES
The practice of energetic businessmen accepting directorates in several
corporations during the same period of time is not a novel situation.
However, with the .upsurge in uranium activity, concurrent directorships
are becoming even more common. In many cases an individual is not
only a director in several corporations, but it is also found that the corporations in which he is a director have identical purposes, i.e. the exploration for and production of uranium ore, or oil, or other minerals.
Consider the following hypothetical. P, a promoter of uranium
ventures, discovers certain uranium deposits. In an effort to develop these
deposits, P organizes a corporation for the purpose of raising the necessary
money from the sale of the corporate stock. Since P was instrumental in
organizing the corporation, he will ordinarily be offered the position of
director if not that of officer. Over a period of years the average
promoter will repeat this procedure many times, and as a consequence will
find that he is an active director in several corporations with similar if
not identical purposes.' Because the stock for the several corporations is
normally sold publically and at different times, the stock ownership of the
various corporations will generally be vested in separate groups of stockholders whose interests are in competition. What is P to do when in the
usual course of his business he obtains knowledge of a newly discovered
uranium deposit which is likely to prove of great value? If the doctrine of
corporate opportunity2 is applied, it would appear that P has the duty of
1. Olson v. Basin Oil Co. of California, 288 P.2d 952 (Cal. 1955). This is a recent
illustration of a promoter who became a director and officer in several corporations
with similar corporate purposes.
2.

Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App.Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d
934, 962 (1941) ; Turner v. American Metal Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 356, 370 (1942). These

cases state the dictrine of corporate opportunity as follows: ".. . one who occupies a
fiduciary relationship to a corporation may not acquire, in opposition to the
corporation, property in which the corporation has an interest or tangible expectancy

